Do we really know what we want? Or must we sometimes construct our preferences on the spot, using whatever cues are available -even when these cues lead us astray? One of the main themes that has emerged from behavioral decision research during the past three decades is the view that people's preferences are often constructed in the process of elicitation. This idea is derived from studies demonstrating that normatively equivalent methods of elicitation (e.g., choice and pricing) give rise to systematically different responses. These preference reversals violate the principle of procedure invariance that is fundamental to all theories of rational choice. If different elicitation procedures produce different orderings of options, how can preferences be defined and in what sense do they exist? This book shows not only the historical roots of preference construction but also the blossoming of the concept within psychology, law, marketing, philosophy, environmental policy, and economics. Decision making is now understood to be a highly contingent form of information processing, sensitive to task complexity, time pressure, response mode, framing, reference points, and other contextual factors. Risk (2000) and The Social Amplification of Risk (2003) .
Sarah
The discussion of the meaning of preference and the status of value may be illuminated by the well-known exchange among three baseball umpires. "I call them as I see them," said the first. "I call them as they are," said the second. The third disagreed, "They ain't nothing till I call them." Analogously, we can describe three different views regarding the nature of values. First, values existlike body temperature -and people perceive and report them as best they can, possibly with bias (I call them as I see them). Second, people know their values and preferences directly -as they know the multiplication table (I call them as they are). Third, values or preferences are commonly constructed in the process of elicitation (they ain't nothing till I call them). The research reviewed in this article is most compatible with the third view of preference as a constructive, context-dependent process. (Tversky & Thaler, 1990, p. 210 
Preface

Cass R. Sunstein
According to the most prominent view in contemporary social science, human beings "have" preferences, and their choices are a product of those preferences. If people are going to select an ice cream flavor, or a television set, or a political candidate, they will consult a kind of internal preference menu, and their choices will result from that consultation. This approach to human behavior dominates economics; it also plays a large role in many other fields, including political science, law, and sociology.
But are people's preferences really elicited, rather than constructed, by social situations? This is an empirical question. Over the last decades, a great deal of progress has been made in answering it. Sometimes people prefer A to B and B to A, depending on how the options are framed. If people are told, "Of those who undergo this medical procedure, 90% are still alive after 5 years," they are far more likely to agree to the procedure than if they are told, "Of those who undergo this procedure, 10% are dead after 5 years." Framing matters for ordinary consumer choices as well as for unusual medical decisions. Most consumers might prefer a small television to a medium-sized one when choosing among the two, but if a large television is added to the set of options, many consumers will favor the medium-sized one over the small one. The same point applies to jury determinations. Other things being equal, a jury is far more likely to convict a defendant on a charge if that charge can be characterized as falling in the middle of a set of possibilities.
Or consider questions from the important domain of regulatory policy: Do ordinary people "have" preferences about their own willingness to pay to eliminate a mortality risk of 1/100,000 or to save members of an endangered species? It turns out that people's decisions are greatly affected by amounts that are initially mentioned to them -so much so as to make it possible for analysts to "construct" an extraordinarily wide range of possible amounts.
According to standard economic theory, default rules shouldn't much matter to what people will do, at least if they can easily contract around those rules; people who "prefer" to contract around default rules will do exactly that. But growing evidence suggests that default rules, both private and public, help to construct people's preferences. Suppose that an employer automatically assumes that employees want to devote a certain percentage of their wages to savings in a retirement plan, while allowing employees to "opt out" of the plan xv © Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org
Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-83428-5 -The Construction of Preference Edited by Sarah Lichtenstein and Paul Slovic Frontmatter More information xvi Preface if they do so explicitly. If the employer so assumes, there will be far more participation in retirement plans than if the employer assumes that employees do not want to participate in that plan unless they say otherwise. The point is immensely important. If default rules help to construct preferences, then the standard analysis of such rules, in both economics and law, turns out to be badly mistaken.
All of these examples suggest that if their goal is to predict human behavior, analysts will blunder if they assume that people have preferences that predate framing, default rules, and social interactions. Sometimes preferences are surprisingly labile. This point also unsettles the widely held view that the role of private and public institutions is to "respect" or "satisfy" preferences. If preferences are constructed, then institutions cannot refer to acontextual preferences at all.
To be sure, there are limits to the process of construction. Some televisions just won't sell; most of the time, people are unlikely to want 80% of their wages to go into savings. It would be an overstatement to say of preferences, as Gertrude Stein said of Oakland, that "there is no there there." But frequently what is there is far less fixed, and far more malleable, than conventional theory predicts.
This book collects decades of work on central issues involving the construction of preferences. It includes the seminal papers on that topic; it also offers newer work whose implications have yet to be fully unpacked. The result is a fundamental rethinking of central issues in social science, with intriguing lessons for many questions about human behavior and about the role of human institutions in helping to produce it. 
